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Non–technical Summary
Interregional migration has often been considered an important means of equilibrating re-
gional disparities in unemployment and wages. The underlying notion is that unemployed
workers leave depressed regions in order to find employment in regions that offer better employ-
ment prospects. While this mechanism has been found to work efficiently in the US, European
studies have often demonstrated that interregional mobility in Europe is an important means
of equilibrating regional disparities only in the long run.
Given the high level of unemployment in Germany, the willingness and ability of unemployed
workers to seek employment in more prosperous and to migrate out of depressed regions is of
central concern if migration is supposed to be an effective means of equilibrating regional
disparities. Recent empirical evidence on internal migration in West Germany is rather mixed.
However, there is no study that explicitly focusses on the migratory behavior of unemployed
jobseekers. This paper closes this gap by looking at the search strategies of unemployed job
seekers across space. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether unemployed
workers in Germany choose search strategies that favor migrating out of depressed regions
with unfavorable re-employment opportunities. In addition, the paper investigates whether an
extensive local accommodation of active labor market policies reduces interregional mobility
among unemployed individuals. This has been suggested by some recent Scandinavian studies.
The underlying notion of such a locking-in effect is that unemployed individuals may postpone
or avoid moving by entering labor market programs.
The findings indicate that unemployed jobseekers choose search strategies that favor leaving
local labor markets with an unfavorable labor demand situation compared to other regional la-
bor markets. Moreover, this responsiveness to local labor market conditions is more pronounced
for men as compared to women. There is also weak evidence that high-skilled jobseekers are
more responsive to local labor demand conditions than low-skilled individuals. Given the high
level of unemployment and generally low mobility levels among low-skilled individuals in Ger-
many, this weak responsiveness may be of some concern. In contrast to the Scandinavian
literature, the local accommodation of labor market programs does not exert any significant
locking-in effect.
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Melanie Arntz∗
April 2005
Abstract
Using a competing-risk framework of exiting unemployment to jobs in a local or a
distant labor market area, this paper investigates whether unemployed individuals in
West Germany choose search strategies that favor migrating out of declining regions.
Moreover, the paper investigates how such search strategies are affected by the local
accommodation of labor market programs. Such programs have been suggested to lead to
a regional locking-in effect. Empirical results are obtained from a stratified Cox partial
likelihood proportional hazards model that allows for location-specific fixed effects and
are compared to estimates from a parametric log-logistic hazard model that takes account
of unobserved individual heterogeneity. The findings indicate that unemployed in West
Germany are responsive to local labor market conditions and are more likely to leave
regions with unfavorable re-employment opportunities. No locking-in effect from labor
market programs is found. The probability of migration is found to increase with search
time.
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1 Introduction
It has often been argued that interregional mobility1 plays a crucial role in equilibrating re-
gional disparities in regional unemployment and wage levels. The underlying notion is that
unemployed workers leave depressed regions in order to find employment in regions that offer
better employment prospects. For the US, Blanchard and Katz (1992) find this adjustment
mechanism to be quite effective. In European countries including Germany, however, interre-
gional labor mobility lacks behind the mobility levels in the US, Canada, Japan and Australia
(Eichengreen 1991, Braunerhjelm 2000). More importantly, even though unemployment and
wage differences are important factors in determining migration in Europe, recent findings sug-
gest that the elasticities of aggregate migration flows with respect to unemployment and wage
differentials are lower than in the US (Puhani, 1999). Decressin and Fatas (1995) examine
regional adjustment dynamics in Europe and find interregional mobility to play a major role in
the adjustment processes after an adverse regional employment shock. However, compared to
the findings by Blanchard and Katz, they find adjustment to take much longer so that regional
disparities tend to be fairly persistent. For Germany, a study by Mo¨ller (1995) also suggests
that interregional mobility is an important means of equilibrating regional disparities in the
long run, but that it takes 2-3 years for interregional mobility to react to an adverse regional
employment shock.
The effectiveness of migration as an equilibrating mechanism ultimately depends on migra-
tory decisions at the individual level. In particular, given the high level of unemployment in
Germany, the willingness and ability of unemployed workers to seek employment in more pros-
perous and to migrate out of depressed regions is of central concern if migration is supposed
to be an effective means of equilibrating regional disparities. Recent empirical evidence on
internal migration in West Germany is rather mixed. Decressin (1994) looks at migration flows
between West German states and finds that these flows tend to go from high to low unemploy-
ment regions. Schlo¨mer and Bucher (2001), on the other hand, do not find any relationship
between unemployment and migration after excluding the East German states. A recent study
by Windzio (2004) on the determinants of individual mobility between the southern and north-
ern states in West Germany even suggests that individuals in high unemployment regions have
lower migration probabilities. However, none of these studies explicitly focusses on the group
of unemployed, but only looks at labor mobility in general. Yet, the migratory behavior of
unemployed jobseekers, is likely to differ from employed individuals.
Therefore, this study examines the migratory behavior of unemployed jobseekers. In par-
ticular, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether unemployed workers in West
Germany choose search strategies that favor migrating out of depressed regions with unfa-
1Throughout this paper, migration and interregional mobility are used synonymously.
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vorable re-employment opportunities. In addition, the paper tests whether an extensive local
accommodation of active labor market policies (ALMP)2 reduces interregional mobility among
unemployed individuals. This has been suggested by some recent Scandinavian studies (West-
erlund 1997 and 1998, Fredriksson 1999). The underlying notion of such a locking-in effect is
that unemployed individuals may postpone or avoid moving by entering labor market programs
such as work creation schemes or training programs. In Germany, there has been an increas-
ing interest in the evaluation of the job finding chances of participants in such programs (e.g.
Bergemann and Schultz 2000, Bergemann et al. 2000, Caliendo et al. 2003) as well as in the
macroeconometric evaluation of the effect of ALMP on the matching efficiency (e.g. Hagen and
Steiner 2000, Hujer et al. 2002). This paper is the first study in the German context that looks
at the effect of ALMP on interregional mobility.
This paper analyzes migratory behavior of unemployed jobseekers within a search-theoretic
framework. The unemployed jobseeker chooses an optimal search strategy by allocating search
effort across different regional labor markets and by choosing region-specific reservation wages
such that the present value of accepting a job at this wage level just equals the present value
of continuing the job search. This optimal search strategy may change over the duration of
unemployment. According to Bailey (1991), migration probabilities are likely to increase with
search time since jobseekers often consider migration only after local job opportunities have
been exhausted. Due to this dynamic character of job search, Goss and Schoening (1984) ar-
gue that a binary choice model of migration that does not control for unemployment duration
may be biased due to this unobserved heterogeneity. Since regional unemployment rates and
regional average unemployment durations are related3, this may explain why studies that do
not take account of unemployment durations show mixed results with regard to the effect of
regional unemployment rates on migration probabilities4. Therefore, recent research explic-
itly models migratory behavior of unemployed individuals within a hazard model specification
of unemployment durations. By distinguishing between the competing-risks of exiting unem-
ployment to different regional labor markets, this approach provides information on the actual
search strategy of unemployed workers. So far, there have been only few studies that apply a
competing-risk hazard model to the analysis of interregional mobility.
One example is the Finish study by Kettunen (2002). Using a Gompertz proportional
hazard model with gamma distributed unobserved individual heterogeneity, the findings do not
2In Germany, ALMP have been an increasingly important policy instrument since the 1970s. During the
late 1990s, the federal labor office spent around 30 % of total expenditures on ALMP (Caliendo et al. 2003).
3In steady state, unemployment rates and average unemployment durations are in fact directly proportional.
4Herzog and Schlottmann (1984) for the US and Tervo (2000) for Finland do find evidence that high regional
unemployment encourages individuals to migrate out of the region. By contrast, UK studies by Pissarides and
Wadsworth (1989) and Hughes and McCormick (1994) suggest that high regional unemployment levels even
discourage mobility during the 1970s and 1980s.
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indicate any significant effect of local labor demand on the migration hazard, i.e. the hazard
of finding employment via residential mobility. Using a Cox proportional hazards model, the
US study by Yankow (2002) finds higher employment and wage levels to significantly reduce
the migration hazard, while the unemployment rate and regional employment growth do not
exert any significant influence. In the German context, only Windzio (2004) uses a single-risk
hazard model framework for the analysis of interregional mobility between north and south
Germany. His findings suggest that higher local unemployment levels lower the migration
hazard. However, as previously mentioned, his study sample is not restricted to unemployed
individuals, but also includes employed individuals as well as individuals who are out of labor
force.
In order to explicitly examine the determinants of interregional mobility of unemployed in-
dividuals in a framework that takes account of the possible duration dependence of the mobility
decision, this study follows the recent research direction and applies a competing risk hazard
model to the analysis of interregional mobility of unemployed individuals in West Germany.
The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample regional file. This register data set is
well-suited for the proposed analysis because due to its sample size even relatively rare events
of interregional mobility are observed in sufficient numbers to analyze migratory behavior of
unemployed individuals. In particular, this data set allows for separate estimations for dif-
ferent sub-groups in order to test whether search strategies differ between men and women
as well as between high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. I estimate a competing-risk pro-
portional hazard model of unemployment durations using the Cox partial likelihood estimator
(Cox, 1972). In order to take into account unobserved location-specific heterogeneity, the study
uses a stratified partial likelihood estimator (Ridder and Tunali, 1999). For comparison, the
paper also estimates a log-logistic accelerated failure time model that takes into account both
location-specific fixed-effects and unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level.
The findings indicate that individuals choose search strategies that favor leaving local labor
markets with an unfavorable labor demand situation compared to other regional labor markets.
Moreover, this responsiveness to local labor market conditions is more pronounced for men as
compared to women. There is also weak evidence that high-skilled jobseekers are more respon-
sive to local labor demand conditions than low-skilled individuals. The local accommodation
of labor market programs does not exert any significant locking-in effect in West Germany.
Migration probabilities are generally found to increase with search time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces a model of job search
across space. Data and some institutional background will be discussed in section 3. Section
4 presents the econometric approach. Estimation results are discussed in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
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2 A search model with search across space
The theoretical framework is similar to Damm and Rosholm (2003) who develop a search-
theoretic approach in which unemployed workers seek employment across two regional labor
markets. The following framework is a simplified version of their approach because I do not
consider the effect of place utilities of different residential locations in the decision process.
Moreover, similar to the two-sector framework by Fallick (1992), I allow for layoffs because for
unemployed individuals it seems implausible to assume that a job is held forever.
In this stationary framework, individuals are allowed to search simultaneously across two
regional labor markets k = l, d (local and distant)5. Jobseekers are risk-neutral and maximize
the expected present value of job search V u, discounted to the present over an infinite horizon
at rate r. Wage offers from each labor market are drawn from known distributions fl(w) and
fd(w) and arrive according to a Poisson process
6 with job offer rate αkσ(ek). This probability
is the product of an exogenous probability of receiving a job offer from k, αk and an increasing
and concave function of the search effort devoted to labor market k, σ(ek) with
∑
k ek ≤ 1. A
worker may loose a job according to the job destruction rate δk.
Searching the two labor markets comes with constant marginal cost c. Thus, searching the
distant labor market is assumed to be no more costly than searching the local labor market7.
The reservation wage and the allocation of search effort across k constitute the search strategy
of the unemployed jobseeker. He chooses the search strategy that maximizes the expected
present value of search V u:
rV u = b− c(el + ed) (1)
+αlσ(el)
∫ wmax
wrl
(V el (w)− V u)dFl(w)
+αdσ(ed)
∫ wmax
wrd(t)
(V ed (w)− V u)dFd(w)
This flow value of being unemployed is equal to the sum of four components: the value of
unemployment b (e.g. transfer payments), the cost of searching the two labor markets, the
expected surplus of a local job times the probability of receiving a job offer locally and the
5This is a generalization of the systematic search literature that considers the job searcher to sequentially
sample regions, firms or sectors according to the expected returns from searching on these sub-markets (see
Salop, 1973, McCall and McCall, 1987)
6Thus, the instantaneous probability of receiving more than one offer from both regional labor markets is
zero.
7This assumption may be justified on two grounds. First of all, nowadays online job offers allow for searching
for jobs anywhere in the economy at the same cost. Secondly, for unemployed job seekers, travel costs due to
job interviews in distant regions are reimbursed by the employment office (see German social law (SGB) III:
§45 and §46). Still, relaxing the assumption of constant marginal search costs points at some important future
extension of the model.
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expected surplus of a distant job that involves interregional residential mobility times the
probability of receiving a job offer in this market. V ek (w) refers to the value of employment at
wage w. For the local market, V el (w) may be written as
rV el (w) = w − δl(V el (w)− V u)
with δl as the local job destruction rate. Thus, the value of being employed is equal to the wage
rate w minus the probability of job loss times the expected value of job loss. At the reservation
wage wrk, the value of being employed at this wage just equals the value of continuing search.
Since V el (w)− V u = w−rV
u
r+δl
, the local reservation wage that equates V el (w
r
l ) and V
u is:
wrl = rV
u (2)
= b− c(el + ed)
+
αlσ(el)
r + δl
∫ wmax
wrl
(w − wrl )dFl(w)
+
αdσ(ed)
r + δd
∫ wmax
wrd(t)
(w − wrd)dFd(w)
Since accepting a job offer from a distant labor market necessitates residential mobility and
thus causes permanent mobility costs m8, the value of a job in a distant labor market is:
rV ed (w) = w −m− δl(V ed (w)− V u)
With V ed (w)− V u = w−m−rV
u
r+δl
, the reservation wage for the distant market may be written as:
wrd = rV
u +m (3)
= b− c(el + ed)
+
αlσ(el)
r + δl
∫ wmax
wrl
(w − wrl )dFl(w)
+
αdσ(ed)
r + δd
∫ wmax
wrd(t)
(w − wrd)dFd(w) +m
Thus, the reservation wage for a job that requires a residential move exceeds the local reservation
wage in order to compensate the job mover for the moving costs. Since moving costs differ across
individuals according to the distribution f(m), individuals with high moving costs are less likely
to accept a job offer from a labor market that involves mobility than others.
Comparative statics suggest that reservation wages for both local and distant jobs increase
with improving job offer arrival rates, decreasing job destruction rates or improved wage offer
8This is a reasonable assumption if moving to a new residential location also involves psychological costs
that are unlikely to be of the lump-sum type.
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distributions anywhere in the economy. Also, reservation wages for both markets increase with
unemployment benefits and decrease with increasing search costs. Increasing moving costs
reduce the local reservation wage and have an ambivalent effect on the reservation wage for the
distant labor market.
Besides determining the reservation wages for both markets, the job searcher endogenously
allocates search effort across the two labor markets. For an interior solution, i.e. the maximum
search effort is not being exhausted such that
∑
k ek < 1
9, optimal search effort is given as:
Rk(e
∗
k) = c (4)
with Rk(e
∗
k) =
αkσ
′(e∗k)
r + δk
∫ wmax
wrk
(w − wrk)dFkw
with Rk denoting the marginal benefit of search in region k. Thus, optimal search effort for
any regional labor market equates the marginal benefit with the marginal cost of search. Thus,
it is clear that even if the regions are identical in all conditions, search intensity in the local
labor market exceeds the search intensity in the distant labor market because of the moving
cost involved when accepting a job in the distant market. Moreover, deteriorating local labor
market conditions relative to the distant labor market, do not only decrease search effort in
the local market but also increases search effort in the distant labor market. This can be
shown formally by differentiating equation (4) with respect to labor market related attributes.
In particular, improving local labor market conditions in one market (i.e. a higher job-offer
arrival rate, a lower job destruction rate or an improvement in the wage distribution) result in
higher local search efforts in this market and lower search effort in the other market10. Thus,
changing relative prospects for re-employment in the two regional labor markets affects the
allocation of search effort11.
The probability that an individual i with characteristics x who is unemployed at the begin-
ning of period t makes a transition to employment in k during this period is now given by the
probability of finding a vacancy in k, the probability of being offered the job and the probability
of accepting it:
hk(t, xi) = αk(xi)σ(e
∗
k) ∗ [1− Fh(wrk(xi))] (5)
It follows from the above framework that the local job finding hazard hl(t, xi) and the migration
hazard hd(t, xi) depend on the labor market conditions in all labor markets by affecting the
9The corner solution where the constraint is binding yields the same qualitative results.
10For a formal exposition in the context of a two-sector model without moving costs see Fallick (1988). His
results carry over to the above case of spatial job search with moving costs.
11Note that it is not necessary for the total amount of job search to affect the marginal benefit or cost of
searching any region, i.e. the constraint on the total amount of job search need not be binding in order to
generate an interaction between both markets. This argument has been discussed in detail in Fallick (1988).
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worker’s search strategy. Based on this framework, we may now derive the following main
hypotheses to be tested regarding the effect of local labor market conditions and local active
labor market policies on the migration and the local job finding hazard:
1. Local labor market conditions influence the migration probability by affecting the alloca-
tion of search effort across regional markets. Deteriorating local job finding opportunities
result in lower reservation wages in all markets and higher search effort in other regional
labor markets. This increases the migration hazard.
2. Entering a labor market programme may serve as a substitute for regular employment12.
Thus, the provision of local labor market programs increases the expected value of unem-
ployment and thus increases the reservation wage in both the local and the distant labor
market. This reduces both the local job finding hazard and the migration hazard. Since
participating in such programs is a possibility to avoid or postpone moving, individuals
also shift search effort to the local area in order to find such a program. This further
reduces the migration hazard and thus results in a regional locking-in effect.
3 Data
3.1 The IAB employment subsample 1981-1997 - regional file
The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample 1981-1997 - regional file (IABESR)
which is described in detail in Bender et al. (2000). This register data set is well-suited for
the proposed analysis of interregional mobility because due to its sample size, even relatively
rare events of interregional mobility are observed in sufficient numbers to analyze migratory
behavior of unemployed individuals. In particular, the IABESR contains spell information on
a 1 % sample of the population working in jobs that are subject to social insurance payments.
As a consequence, the sample does not represent individuals who are not subject to social in-
surance contributions such as self-employed individuals and life-time civil servants. For West
Germany, the sample includes spell information on about 500,000 individuals for whom employ-
ment histories can be reconstructed on a daily basis including the micro-census region of the
workplace. In addition, the data contains spell information on periods for which the individual
received unemployment compensation from the federal employment office (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit) such as unemployment benefits UB (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance UA
(Arbeitslosenhilfe) and maintenance payments during further training MP (Unterhaltsgeld).
12This is a reasonable assumption since during the period under study participating in such programs was
paid similar to a regular job and also renewed the entitlement period for unemployment transfer payments just
as a non-subsidized job did (see German labor promotion act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz)).
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Unfortunately, these information do not allow for identifying periods of registered unem-
ployment. This is because UA is means-tested and thus only applies to a selective group of
individuals who lack other financial resources such as, for example, spouse income. As a conse-
quence, it is not possible to distinguish between those who have left the labor force and those
still unemployed but not receiving any unemployment compensation since both of these states
are unobserved in the IABESR. Therefore, it is necessary to define proxies for unemployment.
Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) introduce two extreme benchmarks, unemployment between jobs
(UBJ) and non-emploment (NE) which cover a lower and an upper bound of unemployment.
Since these definitions may be too extreme for the purpose of this analysis, I choose a definition
of unemployment that lies in between these two benchmarks and which has been introduced
previously by Lee and Wilke (2005). They define unemployment as unemployment between
permanent income transfers (UPIT). Accordingly, unemployment encompasses all periods of
continuous transfer receipt after an employment spell. Gaps between periods of transfer receipt
may not exceed 4 weeks (in the case of suspension13 up to 6 weeks). The unemployment spell is
considered right-censored if the last spell observed involves unemployment compensation or if
the gap between the end of transfer receipt and the beginning of employment exceeds 4 weeks.
This last restriction tends to treat spells of long-term unemployed as censored, but at the same
time censors spells of individuals who are no longer actively seeking employment.
Another drawback of the data that has to be mentioned is that it is not possible to distin-
guish between exits to employment and exits to a labor market program. As a consequence,
local job finding hazards also include program participation hazards. Therefore, the effect of
local labor market programs on the local job finding hazard is difficult to interpret. The effect
on the migration hazard also needs to be interpreted with some care. Unlike other studies
that examine the effect of participating in such programs on the migration hazard, the data
structure of the IABESR only allows for examining the effect of the local provision of such
programs on the search strategy of the unemployed jobseeker prior to entering such programs.
I restrict the analysis to West German14 unemployment spells starting between 1982 to
1995. In addition, I only include individuals aged 26 to 41 years at the time of job loss. These
restrictions ensure that the sample is rather homogenous with respect to the institutional
framework in which these individuals act (see Lu¨demann at al. 2004). Applying the above
unemployment definition, these restrictions yield a sample of 82.444 unemployment spells. Due
to missing data in major variables such as the workplace location, educational background,
marital status and the sector of activity in the previous job, the final sample is further reduced
13Unemployment compensation may be temporarily suspended if an unemployed worker rejects an acceptable
job offer (Sperrzeiten).
14I exclude unemployment spells from West Berlin because the geographical location of Berlin suggests that
interregional mobility patterns may not be analyzed without the East German surrounding.
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to 80.360 unemployment spells. 27.7 % of these unemployment spells are right-censored.
The IABESR includes information on the micro-census region of the workplace so that
comparing the workplace location of the old and the new employer allows for identifying in-
terregional mobility. However, the location of the last workplace is simply carried over to the
subsequent unemployment spell so that the regional identifier of an unemployment spell does
not contain any information on the actual whereabouts of the unemployed individual during
this unemployment period. As a consequence, it is not possible to distinguish between migra-
tion that is induced by a successful job match (contracted migration) and mobility prior to
finding a job in order to seek employment in a different local labor market (speculative mi-
gration). Analyzing interregional mobility based on the IABESR thus always refers to both
speculative and contracted mobility15. I define interregional mobility as movements between
extended labor market regions (LMR), i.e. movements between LMRs that are not located
adjacently. LMRs comprise typical daily commuting ranges such that for the majority of indi-
viduals the workplace is located within the LMR. Therefore, finding employment outside the
extended LMR, i.e. outside a 50 to 80 km radius, should usually necessitate residential mo-
bility. In West Germany, there are 180 labor market regions (LMR) that lump together 270
micro-census regions. Among the 80.360 unemployment spells, 63.6 % exit to a local job within
the extended local labor market region and 8.7 % exit to a job in a distant labor market region.
3.2 Covariates
Individual-level covariates used in the subsequent analysis include age, marital status, for-
mal education, previous job status and previous sector of activity. Unfortunately, the IABESR
does not include several important determinants of mobility such as home ownership and other
household-related variables. On the other hand, the data structure of the IABESR allows for
constructing covariates regarding the employment history of the unemployed jobseeker. Such
indicators capture some heterogeneity across individuals regarding their productivity, but also
regarding their mobility cost.
In particular, I include previous wage income because having the necessary resources to
migrate may be an important determinant of mobility. Additional covariates such as tenure in
the previous job held and an indicator of whether someone has been recalled from his previous
employer may capture individual heterogeneity in the attachment to the local area. An extended
job tenure may be expected to have a negative effect on the migration hazard because a long
job tenure stands for a long duration of residential immobility. Similarly, having been recalled
from the previous employer may increase someone’s local attachment due to waiting for another
15According to Molho (1986) contracted migration is much more common in Europe than speculative migra-
tion.
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future recall.
In addition, I use an indicator of whether an individual has previously been unemployed
and the total previous unemployment duration. Previous unemployment may actually help in
finding re-employment in the local area due to previous experiences with job placement agen-
cies which increase the efficiency of local job search. Total previous unemployment duration,
however, is likely to reduce general job finding chances due to a depreciation of human capital
and possible stigma effects.
Several regional indicators have been added to the micro data set in order to test the main
hypotheses that have been developed in the previous section16. Data sources include the federal
labor office17 and the New Cronos database that is released by Eurostat. In addition, several
indicators have been calculated based on the IABESR itself. Table 1 gives the exact definition
and data sources of all regional and aggregate variables. All regional indicators have been
aggregated to the level of labor market regions. These regional entities are likely to be the
most relevant for the job search behavior of unemployed jobseekers.
The analysis uses several regional indicators that capture local re-employment opportuni-
ties. According to the theoretical framework, a local labor market with unfavorable job finding
chances should be associated with a high migration hazard. In particular, I use the relative
uv-ratio, i.e. the local unemployment-vacancy ratio divided by the unemployment-vacancy
ratio in all other regions, as an indicator of local labor demand conditions relative to all other
labor markets. A high relative uv-ratio should come with relatively low local job-offer arrival
rates. This shifts search effort towards other regions with better labor demand conditions and
thus increases the migration hazard. In addition, I also include the local unemployment-
vacancy ratio. When controlling for the relative labor demand situation, larger imbalances
between local labor supply and local labor demand indicate deteriorating overall labor demand
conditions. This should result in lower job-offer arrival rates and decreasing job finding hazards
anywhere in the economy and thus leave the migration probability unaffected. An additional
indicator of local re-employment opportunities that is included in the analysis is local em-
ployment growth. Higher local employment growth comes with improving local employment
opportunities. This increases the attractiveness of local search and thus discourages migration.
In order to test whether the provision of labor market programs leads to a regional locking-in
16Many thanks to Ralf Wilke and Tobias Hagen who were very helpful in collecting these data.
17Data from the federal labor office (FLO) is coded at the level of FLO districts (Arbeitsamtsbezirke). Since
there is no exact merging rule available to merge data between FLO districts and the micro-census regions that
are used in the IABESR, Arntz and Wilke (2005) develop various merging rules for these two regional entities
based on a digital map intersection. They test the sensitivity of estimation results with regard to the merging
rule applied and find estimation results to be very robust. For this analysis, a simple area weight has been
used to merge regional data with the IABESR. According to Arntz and Wilke (2005) the choice of merging rule
should not significantly affect the estimation results.
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effect, I use theWCS accommodation ratio, i.e. the ratio between the number of individuals
in work creation schemes (WCS) and the number of individuals who are either unemployed or
participating in such programs, as an indicator of the local accommodation of labor market
programs. Unfortunately, a time series encompassing the years between 1982 and 1995 is
only available for work creation programs but not for training programs (TP) which are much
more prevalent in West Germany than WCS18. On the other hand, regions with a high WCS
accommodation ratio tend to have a high TP accommodation ratio so that using the WCS
accommodation ratio may proxy for the local accommodation of labor market programs19.
In addition, I use several regional indicators to control for further differences between local
labor markets. In particular, I control for the sectoral composition, the share of all unemployed
who are male, the population-job density as well as for regional labor turnover.
Higher labor turnover at a given imbalance between labor supply and labor demand means
higher job offer arrival rates and higher job destruction rates in the local area. This comes with
opposing effects on the reservation wages, but increases the local job finding hazard due to the
positive direct effect of higher job-offer arrival rates. The migration hazard is only unaffected
if higher labor turnover is due to an equivalent rise in both the job offer arrival and the job
destruction rate. Otherwise, the migration hazard may either increase or decrease.
The population-job-density measures the number of residents per job. This indicator
reflects some structural differences between local labor markets. In particular, a low population-
job density is likely to prevail in urban job centers where the net flow of commuters to and from
the region is positive. In such employment centers, local job search is likely to generate more
job offers so that a lower population job-density should be associated with a lower migration
hazard.
A high share of male unemployed typically prevails in regions with structural problems
in male-dominated industries such as, for example, old-industrialized regions in North-Rhine
Westphalia and Saarland. This should reduce local job finding chances, especially among men,
and thus increase the migration hazard.
At the aggregate level, the total aggregate hiring rate is used to control for the macroe-
conomic situation. According to Jackman and Savouri (1989), interregional job matching is
more likely during macroeconomic booms with high aggregate hiring rates. Therefore, during
economic recessions, lower migration hazards may be expected.
Summary statistics of all covariates used in the analysis are shown in table 2 and 3 in the
appendix.
18In 1997, almost 270.000 persons entered training programs, while around 75.000 persons entered work
creation schemes in West Germany (Caliendo et al. 2003)
19For the years for which both WCS and TP are available on a disaggregated level, the correlation coefficient
is around +0.5.
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4 Econometric specification
4.1 A stratified Cox proportional hazards model
The econometric analysis focuses on two competing hazard rates, the hazard of finding a job
within the extended LMR (hl) and the hazard of finding a job in a distant LMR (hd), i.e. the
migration hazard, as a function of time spent in unemployment. Since the focus of the analysis
is not on the shape of the hazard function, a competing-risk form of the semi-parametric Cox
proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) is an appropriate choice for the proposed analysis. A
clear advantage of the semi-parametric Cox estimator compared to parametric specifications
is that the baseline hazard is specified fully flexible. This avoids any biases that result from
misspecifying the shape of the baseline hazard in parametric specifications.
Assuming that the two competing risks are independent conditional on all covariates in-
cluded in the model20, the exit-specific hazard rate of the Cox proportional hazard model for
individual i may be written as
hk(ti|xi) = hk(ti)exp(xi(t)βk)
where ti is the elapsed duration of unemployment for individual i, hk(t) is the exit-specific
baseline hazard with k = d, l and xi(t) is a vector of both time invariant and time-varying
covariates. βk is the vector of parameters of interest. An important assumption underlying
any proportional hazards model is that covariates shift the baseline hazard in a proportional
manner. Using the above specification, estimation results may be biased due to unobserved
individual and unobserved regional heterogeneity. Therefore, I modify the above specification
by estimating a fully flexible baseline hazard for each local labor market (LMR) j. This stratified
Cox partial likelihood estimator (SPLE) removes any biases that result from unobserved, time-
invariant characteristics of the local labor market region (LMR). A competing-risk form of the
SPLE may be written as:
hkj(tij|xij, νj) = hkj(tij, νj)exp(xij(tij)βk)
with tij as the duration of unemployment of the ith individual in the jth LMR. hkj(tij, νj) is
the baseline hazard in LMR j and is allowed to depend on an unobserved location-specific fixed
effect νj. This nuisance parameter along with the baseline hazard cancels out of the likelihood
function. The possibility to remove stratum-specific fixed effects has already been discussed by
20This is a critical assumption since estimation results will only be consistent estimates of the true parameters
if all relevant decision variables of whether to stay in the region or not are included in the model (see Gangl,
2004). Since a number of important variables for the migration decision are missing in the specification such as
home ownership or number of children, future research needs to take a closer look at the robustness of results
when this assumption is relaxed.
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Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) and Chamberlain (1985). Ridder and Tunali (1999) discuss the
conditions under which such an approach is appropriate when using time-varying covariates.
In particular, covariates have to be weakly exogenous, i.e. an explanatory variable xt may not
depend on observed exits from unemployment in the same labor market region in period τ ≥ t.
This exogeneity condition may be problematic for some regional indicators. Therefore, I use
lagged variables for those regional indicators for which such an endogeneity issue is likely to
arise (see table 1).
Throughout the subsequent sections, model specification A refers to a Cox partial likelihood
estimator that is stratified by labor market region. The corresponding inference is based on
robust standard errors that take into account the clustering of individuals within labor market
regions (see Lin and Wei, 1989). Otherwise, standard errors of covariates at the regional level
may be biased downward (Moulton, 1990).
4.2 Log-logistic accelerated failure time model
One major caveat of the proposed estimation strategy is that it does not take into account un-
observed heterogeneity at the individual level. Thus, a pure sorting effect may result in negative
duration dependence and parameter estimates may be biased (Lancaster, 1990). Therefore, as
a robustness check, I also estimate a parametric accelerated failure time (AFT) model that
models the unemployment duration of an individual i as
log(ti) = βxij + ui
with ui having density f(.). Since descriptive evidence regarding the shape of the hazard
function suggests a non-monotonic shape that initially rises and declines afterwards, I use
the log-logistic density with shape parameter γ because it allows for a non-monotonic shape
of the hazard function. Moreover, it allows for incorporating unobserved heterogeneity as a
multiplicative factor in the hazard rate, i.e. h(t|α) = αh(t). The frailty term α is assumed
to follow a gamma distribution with expectation one and variance θ. In my analysis, the
individual frailty α takes into account that individuals may have multiple unemployment spells.
Moreover, I include labor market dummies in order to take account of location-specific fixed
effects21. Throughout the subsequent sections, model specification B refers to the AFT log-
logistic model that takes into account unobserved heterogeneity at the level of individuals as
well as location-specific fixed-effects. Unlike model specification A, this specification does not
take into account that individuals are clustered in labor market regions due to the shared
21The difference to the stratification technique is that the inclusion of labor market dummies only allows
for estimating separate intercepts for each labor market, while the stratified model estimates separate baseline
hazards for each stratum in a fully flexible way.
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individual-specific frailty term. Thus, standard errors of covariates at the regional level may
be biased downward (Moulton, 1990).
4.3 Marginal effects on interregional mobility
When estimating an independent competing-risk hazard model with separate parameter vectors
βk, the parameter vector for the migration hazard βd may not be interpreted as the qualitative
effect of covariates on the migration probability. In particular, if the estimated effect of covariate
xi is negative for both hd and hl, the qualitative effect on the migration probability might
even be positive. This is because the likelihood of exit via a specific type of exit depends on
covariate estimates for all exit-specific risks (Lancaster, 1990; Thomas, 1996). In particular,
the probability that an unemployed with characteristics x leaves unemployment for a job in a
distant labor market, i.e. the migration probability is given by
Πd(x) =
∫ t
0
hd(t, x)S(t, x)dt
with hd(t, x) as the migration hazard and S(t, x) as the overall survival function. Thus, the
migration probability is also a function of the covariate parameter for the local job finding
hazard. As a consequence, one possibility to interpret the effect of a covariate on the migration
probability is to look at the marginal effect of a covariate on Πd(x):
κd =
∂Πd(x)
∂xi
I simulate these marginal effects for both model specifications by calculating the difference
between the probability Πd(x¯) for a reference worker
22 and the respective probability after
varying the xi of interest
23. Due to the stratification technique in model specification A, I
obtain separate simulated marginal effects for each local labor market region. In this case, I
calculate the average marginal effect across all strata κ¯d by averaging across all j labor market
specific marginal effects κdj
24.
One confusion in the competing-risk literature on interregional mobility is that the shape
of the migration hazard is often interpreted as the probability of migration across search time.
22The reference worker always refers to an individuals with all dummy variables set to the reference category
and all continuous varibales set to the average value (see table 2).
23For all continuous variables, I simulate the marginal effect of increasing xi by a standard deviation.
24Alternatively, I estimated an unstratified Cox proportional hazards model in order to get a single marginal
effect. I included dummies for labor market regions in order to capture location-specific fixed effects. However,
the clustering test statistic proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999) suggested that the stratified specification with
fully flexible baseline hazards for each stratum is significantly better than the unstratified estimation including
only proportional shift-factors for each labor market region. Therefore, I decided to average marginal effects
across strata instead of reporting the marginal effects of the unstratified model.
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However, the probability of exiting to a specific exit type in a competing-risk framework always
depends on all exit-specific hazards. Thus, in order to interpret the relationship between
mobility and search duration it is more informative to look at the probability of migration
conditional on exiting at time t. This conditional probability Pd(t) is a function of time t and
may be written:
Pd(t, x) =
hd(t, x)
hd(t, x) + hl(t, x)
.
For a given individual with characteristics xi, the shape of this function gives us an idea about
the relative importance of exiting to a distant compared to a local job. For the proportional
hazards model the conditional migration probability for a reference worker is given by:
Pd(t) =
h0d(t)
h0d(t) + h0d(t)
.
with h0k(t) being the baseline hazard for exit type k. Thus, the conditional migration proba-
bility only depends on the shape of both exit-specific baseline hazards.
5 Estimation Results
Table 4 and 5 contain estimation results for the local job finding and the migration hazard for
males and females, respectively. Each table contains coefficient estimates from both models
A and B. According to the clustering test statistic proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999),
the inclusion of labor-market specific strata in model A is highly significant. Thus, parameter
estimates for the unstratified Cox regression contains an additional bias and are therefore
not displayed. Also, since for the AFT log-logistic model unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals is highly significant for both men and women, I only display results from the model
with individual heterogeneity25. Note that the interpretation of the coefficients is reversed when
comparing the results to model A, i.e. a positive (negative) coefficient decreases (increases) the
hazard rate and thus lengthens (shortens) the unemployment duration. The third and sixth
column shows the marginal effect on the likelihood of interregional mobility within two years of
job search26 corresponding to model A and B. Since the findings are quite robust across both
specifications, I discuss findings based on model A if not stated otherwise.
25Estimation results for the AFT log-logistic model without individual heterogeneity and the unstratified Cox
proportional hazards model may be obtained from the author upon request.
26This time restriction is necessary to make results between both models comparable because for the Cox
model there is no possibility to predict the probabilities beyond the last exit time of an individual in the sample.
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5.1 Mobility effects of individual-level covariates
Several individual-level characteristics seem to have a strong influence on mobility and thus
deserve a brief discussion. In particular, formal education has a strong influence on both
the local job finding and the migration hazard for both males and females. Having only a
high-school degree compared to a vocational training significantly reduces both hazards and
thus leads to longer unemployment durations. This is in line with findings from a single-risk
specification of unemployment durations by Lu¨demann et al. (2004). The competing-risk
approach in this paper now allows for identifying the marginal effect of being low-skilled on
the probability of finding employment in a distant labor market. As expected, we find that
a low level of formal education decreases the likelihood of mobility for men (women) by 2 (3)
percentage points while a higher education increases the likelihood of being mobile by 3.7 (2.5).
Compared to the reference worker with a probability of being interregionally mobile of 12.8%
(12.3%), higher education thus leads to a 28.9% (20.3%) increase in the probability of being
mobile for men (women). Thus, as expected, education is an important mobility-enhancing
factor.
According to single-risk specifications of unemployment durations with the same data set
(see Lu¨demann et al., 2004; Biewen and Wilke, 2004), higher previous wage income leads to
shorter unemployment durations. The estimation results for the competing-risk model suggest
that this effect is due to a higher migration hazard rather than due to a higher local job finding
hazard of individuals in a higher wage quintile. The likelihood of leaving the local labor market
region for a distant job even increases by 6.4 (5.8) percentage points for men (women) in the
fifth wage quintile compared to a median wage earner. These effects even exceed the marginal
effect of formal education. This is consistent with a previous study by Windzio (2004) who
finds a significant effect of previous wage income on the hazard of being mobile between north
and south Germany. He suggests that previous wage income proxies for financial resources that
are necessary to bear mobility cost. On the other hand, the percentage of homeowners should
be higher among well-earning individuals. Since home-ownership may be expected to lower
mobility levels, the strong mobility-enhancing effect of previous wage income is somewhat sur-
prising. Apparently, having the necessary financial resources for mobility dominates any other
effects that are captured with previous wage income. While these resources make it possible to
seek and accept employment elsewhere, this exit out of unemployment is not a feasible option
for less well-earning individuals who instead face prolonged unemployment durations.
The previous job status has a strong effect on search outcomes. White-collar worker and
former apprentices, for example, are significantly more mobile than skilled blue-collar workers
(the reference category). Female apprentices, for example, are around 70% more likely to find
employment in a distant labor market than someone who was previously working in a skilled
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blue-collar job. This suggests that previous educational investments such as an apprentice-
ship, increase the willingness to move to another region in order to realize the returns to this
investment.
Interestingly, previous unemployment periods reduce the probability of moving by −2.5
(−1.1) percentage points for men (women). This is mainly due to significant increases in the
local job finding hazard. Apparently, previous unemployment helps in finding employment
locally. This may be due to previous experiences with job placement agencies that tend to
increase the efficiency of local job search.
Total previous unemployment duration significantly decreases both the local job finding and
the migration hazard and thus leads to longer unemployment durations. This is in line with
findings by Biewen and Wilke (2004) for a single-risk specification of unemployment durations
using the same data set and suggests that the length of previous unemployment aggravates
general job finding chances due to, for example, the depreciation of human capital. Moreover,
an increase in total unemployment duration by one standard deviation, reduces the migration
probability by 0.9 (1.5) percentage points for men (women). Prolonged periods of previous
unemployment may have depleted financial resources that are necessary for interregional mo-
bility. Moreover, having experienced previous unemployment suggests an increased likelihood
of future unemployment. These expectations may deter someone from investing in mobility.
Having ever been recalled from the previous employer significantly reduces the probability of
interregional mobility by 8.2 (6.5) percentage points for men (women). As expected, individuals
who have experienced a recall lately, wait for another recall so that their search strategies tend
to be concentrated on the local area.
To sum up, there are a number of individual characteristics that have a major influence
on the likelihood of interregional mobility. Moreover, the findings are quite robust across both
model specifications. Well earning, highly educated males and females who have never been
unemployed nor recalled face the highest probability of being mobile. But how do local labor
market conditions affect the search strategy of individuals with given characteristics?
5.2 Mobility effects of local labor market conditions
The major hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that individuals in local labor markets
with unfavorable re-employment opportunities choose search strategies that favor migrating
out of the region if the labor demand situation is more favorable in other regions. Indeed,
the estimation results indicate that a higher relative uv-ratio leads to a significantly higher
migration hazard (p-values < 0.01) and a significantly reduced local job finding hazard (p-
values < 0.05) among men. Thus, better labor demand conditions elsewhere compared to the
local area shift search effort towards other regions and consequently increases the probability of
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interregional mobility among men by a marginal effect of 1.4. For women, an unfavorable labor
demand situation compared to other regions also comes with higher mobility levels. However,
regional labor demand conditions appear to be less important for women than for men with a
marginal effect of 0.8 percentage points only. Moreover, this mobility effect is due to a significant
negative effect on the local job finding hazard (p-value < 0.05) and not due to a significant
positive effect on the migration hazard. Thus, for women the evidence is less clear-cut than
for men. Still, we can conclude that contrary to the findings by Windzio (2004) regarding
mobility between north and south Germany and in line with findings by Decressin (1994) on
interregional migration flows in West Germany, men and to a lesser extent women in West
Germany react to local labor demand conditions in the expected direction and adjust search
strategies accordingly. These findings are robust across both specifications with the marginal
effects for model B being +1.1 for men and +0.8 for women.
When controlling for relative labor demand conditions, a higher ratio between unemployed
jobseekers and vacancies in the local area indicates deteriorating overall labor demand condi-
tions. This should result in lower job finding hazards everywhere in the economy and thus
leave the migration probability unaffected. As expected, an overall increase in the imbalance
between jobseekers and vacancies at given relative conditions between local labor markets sig-
nificantly decreases both the local job finding and the migration hazard for both sexes and
thus prolongs unemployment durations. Regarding the effect on the migration probability, the
marginal effect is negligible for men and negative (−1.0) for women. Apparently, unfavorable
overall job finding conditions also discourage women to search for jobs in distant labor markets.
One explanation might be that unemployed females who are married have less of an influence
on the relocation decision of the household during times of unfavorable job finding chances that
also aggravate a job change of the male breadwinner.
From a theoretical perspective, it has been argued that higher employment growth increases
the local job finding hazard and results in search strategies that favor staying in the local labor
market. Indeed, higher employment growth significantly increases the local job finding hazard,
while there is a negative but insignificant effect on the migration hazard for both men and
women. Thus the evidence in favor of a significant change in the allocation of search effort
across regions is inconclusive. Instead, the marginal effect of -0.7 (-0.6) for men (women) of
higher local employment growth on the probability of interregional mobility is mainly due to
faster local job exits. Still, the findings do not contradict the notion that individuals react to
local employment growth conditions in the expected way.
These estimation results partially resemble and partially contradict the findings by other
studies that use a competing-risk approach for the analysis of interregional mobility of unem-
ployed jobseekers. The US study by Yankow (2002), for example, also finds no conclusive evi-
dence that local employment growth affects the allocation of search effort across regions. Higher
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employment levels, on the other hand, significantly reduces the migration hazard. Yankow con-
cludes that individuals in the US adapt search strategies to local labor market conditions. The
findings in this paper confirm that West German jobseekers are also responsive to local labor
market conditions. In particular, unfavorable local labor demand conditions relative to other
regional labor markets have a significant and large impact on the probability of interregional
mobility. This contradicts the study by Kettunen (2002) who does not find evidence that un-
employed Finish jobseekers react to local labor demand conditions. However, he uses local
labor demand as an indicator only and does not test the influence of relative labor demand
conditions in the economy.
The second major hypothesis to be tested in this paper concerns the effect of the local
accommodation of labor market programs on the migration hazard and the probability of being
mobile across regions. The theoretical framework in section 2 suggests that the possibility of
participating in such programs may lead to search strategies that favor entering such a program
in order to avoid or postpone migration.
However, at least for men, an increase in the WCS accommodation ratio does not signifi-
cantly affect the migration hazard but significantly increases the local job finding hazard only.
As discussed in the data section, this latter effect is difficult to interpret since entering a local
labor market program is indistinguishable from an exit into regular employment. Thus, the
local job finding hazard is a mixture of the effect of local labor market programs on the search
strategy and the program entering rate. Despite these difficulties, the insignificant effect on
the migration hazard clearly suggests that there is no evidence in favor of a locking-in effect of
active labor market policies for men27.
Contrary to men, an increase in the WCS accommodation ratio significantly reduces the
female local job finding hazard. One explanation for the difference between the female and male
local-job finding hazard might be that participating in a labor market program is more attractive
for women than for the male breadwinner. In this case, a high local accommodation with such
programs should have a stronger positive effect on reservation wages for unemployed women
than for unemployed men. However, interpreting the effect comes with the same difficulties
than for men. More importantly, therefore, we find a negative effect of local work creation
schemes on the female migration hazard. However, since this effect is significant at a 10% level
for the stratified Cox model only, this should be considered as weak evidence in favor of a
27One might argue that the lack of any significant effect is due to an endogeneity issue that arises from the
fact that the local accommodation of ALMP is negatively related to the value of local job search (e.g. lower
local offer arrival rates). Not controlling for all relevant regional indicators that affect the local level of ALMP
may then lead to an upward biased estimate for the effect of ALMP on the migration hazard. While I cannot
rule out that this might pose a problem, I do think that the specification includes most of the relevant regional
indicators such that this problem should not be of any serious concern. Also, lagging the WCS accommodation
ratio mitigates a potential simultaneity issue that may also bias estimation results.
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locking-in effect of active labor market policies for women.
Of course, these results do not contradict findings by Lindgren and Westerlund (2003) re-
garding a locking-in effect of actually participating in labor market programs. As I discussed in
the data section, the structure of the IABESR only allows for testing whether local active labor
market programs exert a significant influence on the search strategies of unemployed jobseekers
prior to entering such programs. No convincing evidence in favor of such locking-in effects
is found. This is in line with a study by Widerstedt (1998). Accordingly, an extensive local
use of labor market programs does not exert any significant influence on individual migration
decisions in Sweden.
Among the other regional control variables some deserve a short discussion. As expected,
local labor turnover does not have a clear effect on the search strategy of either men or women.
Apparently, the opposing effects of higher destruction rates and higher job-offer arrival rates
on the allocation of search effort result in insignificant effects on the migration hazard. Labor
turnover only significantly increases the local job finding hazard for women, thus resulting in
marginally lower migration probabilities for women (−0.7).
In contrast, a high population-job density, clearly enhances mobility among both females
and males. As discussed in section 3.2, a high number of residents per local job seems to
necessitate a geographically broader job search strategy in order to generate job offers. Also,
as expected, the share of unemployed who are male does not have any influence on search
strategies of women. For men, however, regions with a high share of male unemployment
seem to reflect regions with unfavorable local re-employment opportunities so that the local job
finding hazard is significantly reduced. Interestingly, there is also a significant negative effect on
the male migration hazard such that the marginal effect on the migration probability amounts
to −1.9. This might be explained by the idea that regions with a high proportion of male
unemployed tend to be regions with declining male-dominated industries. As a consequence,
many displaced workers seek employment in industries that are also declining in other regions.
Thus, the migration hazard in these regions may be particularly low.
Concerning the effect of the macroeconomic situation on the local job finding and the
migration hazard, the results suggest that interregional migration is positively related to the
business cycle, especially for men. This is consistent with previous evidence by Jackman and
Savouri (1992) for the UK and Bu¨ttner (1999) for Germany.
In conclusion, interregional mobility seems to be mainly driven by individual level charac-
teristics. However, individuals are also sensitive to local labor market conditions. In particular,
individuals choose search strategies that favor migrating out of regions with a relatively unfavor-
able labor demand situation compared to other regions. Given the high level of unemployment
among low-skilled individuals in Germany, the responsiveness of this group of jobseekers to local
labor market conditions may be particularly important for the equilibrating role of migration.
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Therefore, table 6 compares the marginal effects of labor market related covariates between a
sub-sample of individuals with only a high-school degree and a sub-sample of individuals with
a higher education.
First of all, note that for the reference low-skilled worker the probability of leaving the local
labor market within two years in Model A (B) is only 10.3% (1.9%) compared to 24.9% (24.8%)
for the high-skilled reference worker. Besides these large differences in the migration probability,
there are also differences in the effects of labor market conditions. In particular, low-skilled
individuals seem to choose search strategies that favor staying in regions with high employment
growth. However, a relatively unfavorable local labor demand situation only insignificantly
lowers the migration hazard. Thus, the marginal effect on the migration probability of +0.5
for model A is mainly due to a significantly lower local job finding hazard for low-skilled
jobseekers. The corresponding effects on the local job finding and the migration hazard of
high-skilled individuals are also insignificant but have the expected negative and positive signs
such that the marginal effect is +1.8. Thus, model A gives weak evidence that low-skilled
individuals are less responsive to relatively unfavorable local labor demand conditions than
high-skilled unemployed. For model B, however, no clear differences between both samples are
detectable. Still, the findings suggest a weak responsiveness of low-skilled individuals to relative
labor demand conditions. Given the high unemployment levels and the low level of mobility
among low-skilled as compared to high-skilled unemployed, this may be of some concern.
5.3 Mobility and unemployment duration
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, the likelihood of interregional mobility is unlikely
to be constant across search time. Bailey (1991), for example, suggests that migration is a last
resort after local job opportunities have been exhausted. Thus, mobility levels should increase
with search time. As discussed in the section on marginal effects, the probability of leaving the
local labor market area for a job in a distant region conditional on finding employment at time
t is given by the conditional migration probability Pd(t). Figure 1 shows the estimated hazard
functions for the local job finding and the migration hazard as well as the smoothed conditional
migration probability for a men with average characteristics for both model specifications28.
First of all, note that the estimated local job finding hazard for the Cox model initially
increases and declines afterwards, but that the migration hazard shows a second peak before
declining again. Thus, the conditional migration probability is increasing with search time
during the first two years of job search but declines afterwards. The falling shape of both
hazard functions as well as of the conditional migration probability at high unemployment
28In this case, the baseline hazard estimates for the Cox model refer to an unstratified model with additional
labor market dummies in order to obtain one single estimated baseline hazard instead of 180 separate baseline
hazards for the stratified model.
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durations may of course be due to unobserved individual heterogeneity which is not taken
into account in the Cox model. As a consequence a pure sorting effect may result in a falling
migration probability at higher unemployment durations since the sample may increasingly
contain immobile individuals. Indeed, the figures for the log-logistic model with unobserved
heterogeneity suggest that this sorting effect may be relevant. While both hazards initially
rise and decline afterwards, the slope for the local job finding hazard is flatter than in the Cox
model. More importantly, the migration hazard only slightly decreases after an initial rise and
remains on a high level. As a consequence, the migration probability monotonously increases
with search time. Put differently, a male jobseeker who finds employment only after a long
unemployment duration is increasingly likely to do so in other regions. I consider this as strong
evidence that migration is indeed some kind of last resort that becomes a more relevant option
after a long duration of unsuccessful job search. Figure 2 confirms these findings for women.
Again, the conditional migration probabilities for both models are increasing with search time.
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Figure 1: Local job finding hazard (top), migration hazard (center) and conditional migration
probabilities (bottom) for men with average characteristics, Cox model (first column) and log-
logistic model (second column), IABS 1982-1995
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Figure 2: Local job finding hazard (top), migration hazard (center) and conditional migration
probabilities (bottom) for a women with average characteristics, Cox model (first column) and
log-logistic model (second column), IABS 1982-1995
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6 Conclusion
This paper has looked at a competing-risk model of exiting unemployment to either a job
in a local or a distant labor market area in order to test whether unemployed individuals
in West Germany adjust their search strategy to favor migrating out of depressed regions.
The equilibrating role of interregional migration critically hinges on such search strategies. In
addition, this paper has also examined whether the local provision of labor market programs
discourages migration by shifting search effort towards the local labor market area. Using both
a stratified Cox model that takes into account location-specific fixed effects as well as a log-
logistic accelerated failure time model that takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals, the paper derives at the following conclusions:
• While local employment growth does not significantly affect the search strategy of unem-
ployed jobseekers in West Germany, an unfavorable labor demand situation compared to
other regions clearly shifts search effort towards other regions and increases the likelihood
of mobility among the unemployed. This responsiveness is more pronounced for men and
high-skilled individuals than for women and low-skilled individuals. Given the high level
of unemployment among low-skilled individuals in Germany, the weak responsiveness of
low-skilled individuals may be of some concern. In particular, due to low mobility lev-
els among low-skilled individuals, this group is highly dependent on local labor market
conditions. Deteriorating local conditions may then result in prolonged unemployment
durations for low-skilled as compared to high-skilled individuals who are much more likely
to leave the region. Recent labor market reforms demand unemployed individuals in Ger-
many to accept job offers in distant labor market regions. Otherwise, transfer payments
may be interrupted or even cut permanently. These measures might be justified in order
to counteract an increase in long-term unemployment of low-skilled individuals who are
stuck in a local labor market region with unfavorable employment prospects.
• There is no evidence in favor of a locking in effect of active labor market programs
on the interregional mobility among male unemployed in West Germany. For female
jobseekers, there is weak evidence in favor of a minor locking-in effect. Still, it seems
safe to conclude that the extensive local use of ALMP does not significantly affect search
strategies of unemployed individuals. Due to the structure of the data set used for the
analysis this result only applies to individuals prior to entering a labor market program.
Thus, there may well be locking-in effects on individuals who are actually participating
in such programs. This necessitates further research.
• The marginal effects of individual-level characteristics on the migration probability clearly
dominate any labor market related effects. In particular, higher formal education, a
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previous white-collar job or apprenticeship as well as higher previous wage income strongly
enhance interregional mobility among unemployed workers, while previous unemployment
and a recall from the previous employer discourage interregional mobility.
• The likelihood that an unemployed individual is mobile across regions is found to increase
with search time. This confirms the notion that migration is considered only after local job
search turned out to be unsuccessful. This is also consistent with the finding by Mo¨ller
(1995) that interregional migration in Germany is an important but slow adjustment
mechanism after regional shocks.
Despite the robustness of estimation results across model specifications, there are a number
of methodological and data caveat that point at some future research directions. First of all,
instead of using a proportional hazards model that assumes covariates to shift the baseline haz-
ard in a proportional manner, censored quantile regression may be an interesting alternative
because it allows for detecting whether the effect of certain covariates on interregional mobility
vary with search time. Secondly, future research should check whether relaxing the critical
assumption of independent competing risks significantly alters estimation results. Clearly, not
controlling for some relevant household-related characteristics suggests that this independence
assumption may be questionable in this analysis. Thirdly, not having periods of registered un-
employment but only using a proxy for unemployment periods may be problematic. Therefore,
estimation results based on the IABESR should be compared to results based on registered
unemployment data.
This paper also points at some future research directions regarding the migratory behavior
of unemployed individuals. First of all, the focus of the analysis was on the effect of local em-
ployment opportunities on interregional mobility. This analysis should be extended to examine
whether unemployed individuals in West Germany adjust their search strategy to regional wage
differentials rather than to regional differentials in labor demand conditions. Moreover, apart
from the relative unemployment-vacancy ratio, this paper only looked at the effect of push fac-
tors, i.e. conditions in the local labor market that encourage or discourage individuals to leave
the area. Future research should also examine the effect of pull factors by explicitly looking
at the destination choice of unemployed individuals who leave their local labor market for a
distant job.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Description and data source of regional and aggregate variablesa
Variables Description Data Source
Share of agriculture Percentage share of employment in agriculture IABSb
Share of inv. goods ind. Percentage share of employment in the investment
goods industry
IABSb
Share of cons. goods
ind.
Percentage share of employment in the consumption
goods industry
IABSb
Share of construction Percentage share of employment in the construction
sector
IABSb
Share of retail Percentage share of employment in retail IABSb
Share of other services Percentage share of employment in other services IABSb
Share of high-skilled
employment
Percentage share of high-skilled individuals among all
employees
IABSb
Population-job-density Populationddivided by total employmentc New Cronosd,
FLOc
Share of male unemp.e Number of male unemployed divided by total unem-
ployed ∗100
FLOc
Ul/Vl
e Ratio between unemployment jobseekers and vacan-
cies in the local area
FLOc
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
e Local unemployment-vacancy ratio divided by
unemployment-vacancy ratio in all other regions
FLOc
Employment growth Yearly percentage change in the stock of employees IABSb
Labor turnover Hirings + separations during the year divided by the
stock of employees in the same year ∗100
IABSb
WCS accommodation
ratioe
Number of participants in work creation schemes di-
vided by number of unemployed plus participants in
WCS ∗100
FLOc
Aggregate hiring rate Aggregate hirings during the year divided by the num-
ber of employed on Jan 1st of the year ∗100
IABSb
a All regional indicators have been aggregated to the level of labor market regions.
b Variables have been calculated on the basis of the IABESR.
c Data are coded at the level of federal labor office districts and are released by the federal labor
office (FLO). Data have been merged using the merging schemes proposed by Arntz and Wilke
(2005).
d New Cronos database is released by Eurostat.
e Variables with a 1 year lag.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the estimation, IABS 1982-1995, Males
Spells ending ...
All Spells in migration locally
Variables Mean St.
Dev.
Mean St.
Dev.
Mean St.
Dev.
Married1 0.506 0.500 0.495 0.500 0.523 0.500
Age 26-29 1 0.355 0.478 0.324 0.468 0.366 0.482
Age 30-331,2 0.208 0.406 0.221 0.415 0.207 0.405
Age 34-371 0.222 0.415 0.232 0.422 0.218 0.413
Age 38-411 0.216 0.411 0.223 0.416 0.209 0.407
Formal education
High school degree1 0.291 0.454 0.207 0.405 0.293 0.455
Vocational training1,2 0.649 0.477 0.641 0.480 0.668 0.471
Higher education1 0.060 0.237 0.153 0.360 0.039 0.193
Wage quintile
1st1 0.201 0.401 0.181 0.385 0.182 0.386
2nd1 0.342 0.474 0.293 0.455 0.351 0.477
3rd1,2 0.196 0.397 0.171 0.377 0.210 0.407
4th1 0.133 0.340 0.147 0.354 0.138 0.345
5th1 0.128 0.334 0.208 0.406 0.118 0.323
Previous job status
Apprentice1 0.016 0.126 0.018 0.133 0.016 0.124
Unskilled blue-collar job1 0.367 0.482 0.273 0.446 0.373 0.484
Skilled blue-collar job1,2 0.431 0.495 0.335 0.472 0.474 0.499
White-collar job1 0.165 0.371 0.343 0.475 0.121 0.326
Part-time job1 0.021 0.144 0.031 0.172 0.017 0.129
Previous sector of activity
Agriculture1 0.042 0.201 0.024 0.154 0.048 0.215
Investment goods ind.1 0.207 0.405 0.188 0.391 0.207 0.405
Consumption goods ind.1 0.088 0.284 0.083 0.275 0.085 0.280
Construction1 0.262 0.440 0.185 0.388 0.299 0.458
Retail1,2 0.175 0.380 0.201 0.401 0.166 0.372
Other services1 0.225 0.417 0.319 0.466 0.194 0.395
Tenure in previous job (mths) 19.11 28.44 16.73 23.57 18.62 28.03
Prev. unemployment spell1 0.716 0.451 0.607 0.488 0.751 0.432
Continued on next page...
29
... table 2 continued
Tot. prev. unemp. dur. (mths) 11.69 15.74 8.973 14.24 12.23 15.49
Recall from prev. employer1 0.239 0.427 0.081 0.273 0.293 0.455
19831,2 0.074 0.262 0.070 0.256 0.076 0.265
1984-19871 0.306 0.461 0.286 0.452 0.325 0.468
1988-19911 0.262 0.440 0.243 0.429 0.269 0.443
1992-19951 0.358 0.479 0.401 0.490 0.330 0.470
Fourth quarter1 0.171 0.376 0.197 0.398 0.137 0.344
Sectoral composition
Share of agriculture4 3.230 2.941 3.137 2.913 3.256 2.945
Share of inv. goods ind.4 24.98 8.439 25.01 8.483 24.97 8.451
Share of cons. goods ind.4 11.28 6.576 10.28 5.823 11.77 6.846
Share of construction4 7.975 2.239 7.663 1.947 8.132 2.326
Share of retail4 18.61 4.455 19.20 4.525 18.35 4.442
Share of other services4 33.92 7.175 34.71 7.024 33.52 7.169
Other regional characteristics
Share of high-skilled emp.4 6.355 3.013 6.923 3.053 6.070 2.944
Population-job density4 3.015 0.993 3.011 0.998 3.027 0.994
Share of male unemployment3,4 55.01 5.522 54.48 5.145 55.11 5.687
Employment growth4 0.337 2.439 0.136 2.419 0.470 2.447
Labor turnover4 59.20 9.865 58.14 9.217 59.80 10.13
Ul/Vl
3,4 16.58 13.14 15.44 12.41 17.02 13.43
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
3,4 1.242 0.641 1.229 0.657 1.244 0.637
WCS accommodation ratio3,4 3.313 2.404 3.269 2.449 3.387 2.460
Aggregate indicators
Aggregate hiring rate4 30.99 2.425 30.91 2.425 31.01 2.452
Number of spells 49617 4757 34907
1Dummy Variable
2Reference category in the following estimation.
3Lagged variable (lag: 1 year)
4Time-varying variables: Ul/Vl,
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
and WCS accommodation ratio on a quarterly basis, all others on a
yearly basis.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables, IABS 1982-1995, Females
Spells ending ...
All Spells in migration locally
Variables Mean St.
Dev.
Mean St.
Dev.
Mean St.
Dev.
Married1 0.601 0.490 0.432 0.496 0.524 0.499
Age 26-291 0.371 0.483 0.432 0.496 0.341 0.474
Age 30-331,2 0.212 0.409 0.214 0.411 0.202 0.402
Age 34-371 0.205 0.404 0.179 0.383 0.217 0.412
Age 38-411 0.212 0.409 0.175 0.380 0.240 0.427
Formal education
High school degree1 0.276 0.447 0.173 0.378 0.280 0.449
Vocational training1,2 0.644 0.644 0.672 0.470 0.647 0.478
Higher education1 0.080 0.271 0.155 0.362 0.074 0.262
Wage quintile
1st1 0.594 0.491 0.412 0.492 0.569 0.495
2nd1 0.238 0.426 0.279 0.449 0.267 0.443
3rd1,2 0.078 0.268 0.118 0.323 0.082 0.275
4th1 0.047 0.213 0.099 0.298 0.046 0.210
5th1 0.043 0.203 0.092 0.290 0.036 0.185
Previous job status
Apprentice1 0.026 0.160 0.039 0.193 0.031 0.173
Unskilled blue-collar job1 0.236 0.425 0.141 0.348 0.244 0.430
Skilled blue-collar job1,2 0.088 0.283 0.061 0.240 0.099 0.299
White-collar job1 0.458 0.498 0.613 0.487 0.430 0.495
Part-time job1 0.192 0.394 0.145 0.353 0.195 0.396
Previous sector of activity
Agriculture1 0.013 0.113 0.009 0.097 0.016 0.124
Investment goods ind.1 0.134 0.340 0.100 0.301 0.117 0.321
Consumption goods ind.1 0.128 0.334 0.086 0.280 0.127 0.333
Construction1 0.019 0.135 0.014 0.119 0.022 0.146
Retail1,2 0.220 0.414 0.228 0.420 0.221 0.415
Other services1 0.486 0.500 0.562 0.496 0.497 0.500
Tenure in previous job (mths) 27.43 36.72 24.59 31.65 22.30 32.98
Prev. unemployment spell1 0.571 0.495 0.539 0.499 0.639 0.480
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Tot. prev. unemp. dur. (mths) 7.242 11.51 6.304 10.68 8.534 12.18
Recall from prev. employer1 0.193 0.395 0.087 0.281 0.215 0.411
19831,2 0.067 0.250 0.059 0.236 0.056 0.231
1984-19871 0.277 0.448 0.264 0.441 0.254 0.435
1988-19911 0.292 0.455 0.297 0.457 0.303 0.459
1992-19951 0.363 0.481 0.380 0.485 0.387 0.487
Fourth quarter1 0.231 0.421 0.225 0.418 0.210 0.407
Sectoral composition
Share of agriculture4 3.061 2.760 2.821 2.436 2.961 2.578
Share of inv. goods ind.4 25.21 8.580 24.73 8.052 24.93 8.403
Share of cons. goods ind.4 10.67 6.066 9.996 5.665 10.82 6.145
Share of construction4 7.674 1.972 7.462 1.802 7.737 2.006
Share of retail4 18.89 4.421 19.33 4.446 18.89 4.412
Share of other services4 34.49 7.120 35.67 7.132 34.66 7.095
Other regional characteristics
Share of high-skilled emp.4 6.682 2.954 7.279 3.118 6.653 2.934
Population-job density4 2.981 0.979 2.933 0.986 2.966 0.970
Share of male unemployment3,4 54.17 5.281 54.26 4.885 54.19 5.367
Employment growth4 0.351 2.409 0.261 2.386 0.383 2.415
Labor turnover4 58.71 9.437 58.63 8.818 59.46 9.664
Ul/Vl
3,4 15.44 12.50 14.27 11.52 14.49 11.78
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
3,4 1.222 0.660 1.182 0.657 1.196 0.660
WCS accommodation ratio3,4 3.310 2.328 3.137 2.225 3.317 2.331
Aggregate indicators
Aggregate hiring rate4 31.17 2.548 31.13 2.590 31.20 2.596
Number of spells 30743 2229 16172
1Dummy Variable
2Reference category in the following estimation.
3Lagged variable (lag: 1 year)
4Time-varying variables: Ul/Vl,
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
and WCS accommodation ratio on a quarterly basis, all others on a
yearly basis.
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